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THE NEGOTIATOR AS PROFESSIONAL: 
UNDERSTANDING THE COMPETING INTERESTS OF 
A REPRESENTATIVE NEGOTIATOR 
Trevor C. W. Farrow1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This article is about lawyers as negotiators, and in particular, it 
is about identifying and understanding the influential and 
potentially competing interests that are—or at least should be—
in the minds of lawyers (and potentially other third party 
representatives) during the overall negotiation process.  As 
several commentators have recently and correctly pointed out, 
the “overwhelming preponderance” of what lawyers do 
“involves negotiating with others.”2  There is little doubt that 
the bulk of a solicitor’s work involves representative 
negotiation, whether it is deal-making as a corporate lawyer, 
negotiating with suppliers or outside counsel as an in-house 
lawyer, working out a divorce settlement as a collaborative 
family lawyer, or crafting the provisions of a collective 
bargaining agreement as a labour lawyer.  Equally important are 
                                            
1 Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, 
tfarrow@osgoode.yorku.ca.  I first presented the ideas in this article in a guest 
lecture in Frederick H. Zemans’ “Lawyer as Negotiator” course at Osgoode 
Hall Law School in Toronto on 25 October 2006.  I am grateful to Colleen M. 
Hanycz for comments on an early draft of this article, to Jonathan Finkelstein 
for research assistance, and to my students – through numerous research 
papers and in-class discussions – who have significantly influenced my 
thinking in this article. 
 
2 Charles B. Wiggins & L. Randolph Lowry, eds., Negotiation and Settlement 
Advocacy: A Book of Readings, 2d ed. (St. Paul, MN: Thomson, 2005) 
[Negotiation and Settlement Advocacy] at 497. 
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the tools of negotiation in many aspects of a litigator’s day, 
including negotiating the terms of a settlement, plea bargaining, 
working out the parameters of and approaches to an advocacy 
brief with a client, scheduling hearing dates with opposing 
counsel, or engaging in a court-annexed dispute resolution 
session.  As Marc Galanter has commented, the work of 
litigators could more accurately be described as “litigotiation”.3  
So what this article is dealing with—representative 
negotiation—is the bread and butter of what essentially most 
lawyers do most of the time. 
While there continues to be an increasing amount of literature 
on the mechanics and strategies of negotiation,4 the underlying 
                                            
3 Marc Galanter and M. Cahill, “Most Cases Settle: Judicial Promotion and 
Regulation of Settlements” (1994) 46 Stan. L. Rev. 1338 at 1342, cited in Hon. 
George W. Adams, Q.C., Mediating Justice: Legal Dispute Negotiations 
(Toronto: CCH, 2003) at 112 [Mediating Justice].  See further Michael P. 
Silver, Mediation and Negotiation: Representing Your Clients (Toronto and 
Vancouver: Butterworths, 2001) at v [Mediation and Negotiation]. 
 
4 Perhaps the best-known and still leading example of this literature is Roger 
Fisher, William Ury and Bruce Patton (for the 2d edition), Getting to Yes: 
Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In, 2d ed. (New York: Penguin 
Books, 1991) [Getting to Yes].  For a recent example, see Colleen M. Hanycz, 
“Introduction to the Negotiation Process Model” [“Introduction to the 
Negotiation Process Model”], in Colleen M. Hanycz, Frederick H. Zemans 
and Trevor C. W. Farrow, eds., The Theory and Practice of Representative 
Negotiation (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, in progress) [The Theory and 
Practice of Representative Negotiation].  For general collections, see e.g. 
Michael L. Moffitt and Robert C. Bordone, eds., The Handbook of Dispute 
Resolution (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2005), Max H. Bazerman, ed., 
Negotiation, Decision Making and Conflict Management (Cheltenham, UK: 
Edward Elgar, 2005), Julie Macfarlane, gen. ed., Dispute Resolution: Readings 
and Case Studies, 2d ed. (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2003) [Dispute 
Resolution: Readings and Case Studies], The Theory and Practice of 
Representative Negotiation, supra.  For further background materials, see 
Trevor C. W. Farrow, “Dispute Resolution and Legal Education: A 
Bibliography” (2005) 7 Cardozo J. of Conflict Res. 119 [“Dispute Resolution 
and Legal Education: A Bibliography”], Trevor C. W. Farrow, “Dispute 
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interests that are typically at stake in representative 
negotiations from the perspective of representatives—
particularly negotiations involving lawyers—have not been 
adequately studied.5  And until all interests are identified and 
placed squarely on the table as active parts to the overall 
process, representative negotiation will be less than fully 
effective, ethical and satisfying as a process for all those 
involved, including clients, lawyers and the public. 
                                                                                                            
Resolution, Access to Civil Justice and Legal Education” (2005) 42 Alta L. 
Rev. 741 [“Dispute Resolution, Access to Civil Justice and Legal Education”], 
Trevor C. W. Farrow, “Thinking About Dispute Resolution”, Review Essay 
(2003) 41 Alta L. Rev. 559 [“Thinking About Dispute Resolution”]. 
 
5 For useful starting points, see Robert J. Condlin, “Bargaining in the Dark: 
The Normative Incoherence of Lawyer Dispute Bargaining Role” (1992) 51 
Md. L. Rev. 1, Ronald J. Gilson and Robert H. Mnookin, “Disputing Through 
Agents: Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation” (1994) 94 
Colum. L. Rev. 509, Donald G. Gifford, “The Synthesis of Legal Counseling 
and Negotiation Models: Preserving Client-Centered Advocacy in the 
Negotiation Context” (1987) 34 UCLA L. Rev. 811 [“The Synthesis of Legal 
Counseling and Negotiating Models”], Carrie Menkel-Meadow, “Lawyer 
Negotiations: Theories and Realities – What We Learn From Mediation” 
(1993) Mod. L. Rev. 361, Carrie Menkel-Meadow, “Toward Another View of 
Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving” (1984) 31 UCLA L. 
Rev. 754 [“Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation”].  For some recent 
collections, see Negotiation and Settlement Advocacy, supra note 2, The 
Theory and Practice of Representative Negotiation, supra note 4, Charles B. 
Craver, Effective Legal Negotiation and Settlement, 5th ed. (Newark, NJ: 
LexisNexis, 2005) [Effective Legal Negotiation and Settlement].  See further 
Leonard L. Riskin and James E. Westbrook, eds., Dispute Resolution and 
Lawyers (St. Paul, MN: West Publishing, 1987) at 52-70, Wayne P. Brazel, 
Effective Approaches to Settlement: A Handbook for Lawyers and Judges 
(Clifton, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1988), Xavier M. Frascogna, Jr. and H. Lee 
Hetherington, Negotiation Strategies for Lawyers (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall, 1984), Robert A. Wenke, The Art of Negotiation for Lawyers 
(Long Beach, CA: Richter Publications, 1985).  See also Kenneth Arrow et al., 
eds., Barriers to Conflict Resolution (New York: Norton, 1995) at pt. IV. 
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II. TRADITIONAL VISIONS OF THE 
REPRESENTATIVE NEGOTIATOR 
The basic role of the lawyer is to do something on behalf of 
someone else: typically the client.  In the context of 
representative negotiations, what is typically being sought is a 
negotiated deal or settlement that is to the benefit of the client, 
not the representative lawyer.  Most commentators contemplate 
this role of the representative as one of “agent” on behalf of his 
or her “principal”;6 or alternatively as a “surrogate”,7 “affiliate”8 
or bargaining “representative” on behalf of his or her 
“constituents”.9  Although each has a slightly different (more or 
                                            
6 See e.g. Robert H. Mnookin and Lawrence E. Susskind, eds., Negotiating on 
Behalf of Others: Advice to Lawyers, Business Executives, Sports Agents, 
Diplomats, Politicians, and Everybody Else (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications, 1999) passim [Negotiating on Behalf of Others].  See further 
Negotiation and Settlement Advocacy, supra note 2 at 497, Jeffrey Z. Rubin 
and Frank E. A. Sander, “When Should We Use Agents?  Direct vs. 
Representative Negotiation” (1988) 4 Negot. J. 395 [“When Should We Use 
Agents?”], in Negotiation and Settlement Advocacy, supra note 2 at 501, 
Jayne Seminare Docherty and Marcia Caton Campbell, “Teaching 
Negotiators to Analyze Conflict Structure and Anticipate the Consequences 
of Principle-Agent Relationships” (2004) 87 Marq. L. Rev. 655 [“Teaching 
Negotiators to Analyze Conflict Structure and Anticipate the Consequences 
of Principle-Agent Relationships”], in Negotiation and Settlement Advocacy, 
supra note 2 at 508. 
 
7 See e.g. Negotiation and Settlement Advocacy, supra note 2 at 516. 
 
8 See e.g. “The Synthesis of Legal Counseling and Negotiating Models” (citing 
Melvin Aron Eisenberg, “Private Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute-
Settlement and Rulemaking” (1976) Harv. L. Rev. 637 at 660), supra note 5 at 
837. 
 
9 See e.g. Dean G. Pruitt, Negotiation Behavior (New York: Academic Press, 
1981) at 41 [Negotiation Behavior], in Negotiation and Settlement Advocacy, 
supra note 2 at 499.  See also “Teaching Negotiators to Analyze Conflict 
Structure and Anticipate the Consequences of Principle-Agent 
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less expansive) meaning of the relationship, for my purpose the 
common defining characteristic of all of these descriptions is 
that, at the end of the day, the deal is about the client’s 
interests, not those of the lawyer.  And notwithstanding modern 
negotiation models that promote cooperative, interest-based 
approaches,10 this vision of the representative negotiator is still 
largely influenced by and located in notions of the lawyer as the 
client’s “zealous advocate”.11  The problem, even under these 
models, is that—as a practical matter—there is much more at 
play in the representative negotiator’s mind than just what the 
client cares about.12 
To address this deficiency, several discussions of lawyers (or 
others) as representative negotiators have expanded this 
principal-agent vision somewhat by suggesting that the role of a 
representative negotiator is defined not by one but by two 
interests: the interests of his or her client and the interests that 
are at stake vis-à-vis his or her bargaining opposite.  For 
example, Wiggins and Lowry comment that: “As representative 
                                                                                                            
Relationships”, supra note 6, David J. Corry, Negotiation: The Art of Mutual 
Gains Bargaining (Aurora: Canada Law Book, 2000) at 90 [The Art of Mutual 
Gains Bargaining]. 
 
10 See e.g. Getting to Yes, supra note 4, and generally “Dispute Resolution and 
Legal Education: A Bibliography”, supra note 4. 
 
11 For a useful discussion of this role, see Mediating Justice, supra note 3 at 
136-147. 
 
12 As Fisher and Ury argue, “Whether it is his employer, his client, his 
employees, his colleagues, his family, or his wife, every negotiator has a 
constituency to whose interests he is sensitive.  To understand that 
negotiator’s interests means to understand the variety of somewhat differing 
interests that he needs to take into account.”  Getting to Yes, supra note 4 at 
48.  I am grateful to Colleen M. Hanycz for drawing this passage to my 
attention. 
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negotiators, attorneys always have two negotiations occurring 
simultaneously: One with their bargaining opposite and one 
with their own client.”13  Further, as Rubin and Sander question: 
“What if the agent…care[s] about his future relationship with 
the other agent, and wants to be remembered as a fair and 
scrupulous bargainer?  How should this conflict get 
resolved…?”14   
The position occupied by typical representative negotiators 
under these sorts of two-interest models is said to be a 
“boundary-role position”, in which representatives, as Dean 
Pruitt comments: “can be thought of as intermediaries whose 
job is to reconcile the interests of their own and the opposing 
organization.  They must represent the interests of their 
constituents to the opposing representative and represent the 
views of the opposing representative to their constituents.”15 
These somewhat expanded treatments of the relevant interests 
at stake in representative negotiations—beyond those of simply 
the representative’s clients—help better to understand the 
process of representative negotiation and what actions are and 
should be taken by representatives on behalf of their clients in 
any given context.  However, the problem with these somewhat 
expanded models, in my view, is that they still do not paint the 
full picture of what is typically going on inside the 
representative negotiator’s mind, and as such, provide an 
                                            
13 Negotiation and Settlement Advocacy, supra note 2 at 498 (commenting 
on arguments presented in “When Should We Use Agents?”, supra note 6).  
But see also Negotiation and Settlement Advocacy, supra note 2 at 497. 
 
14 “When Should We Use Agents?”, supra note 6 at 505 (cited to Negotiation 
and Settlement Advocacy, supra note 2, emphasis omitted). 
 
15 Negotiation Behavior, supra note 9 at 500 (cited to Negotiation and 
Settlement Advocacy, supra note 2). 
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impoverished view of his or her role, both in terms of its 
responsibilities and its potential opportunities. 
III. NEGOTIATOR-AS-PROFESSIONAL 
To address these deficiencies, I advance an alternative, 
expansive model of the representative negotiator that I call the 
“negotiator-as-professional” model.  It is a model that sees the 
role of the representative negotiator as being defined not simply 
by the client’s interests or by the two interests that are 
identified by the boundary-role position models16, but rather by 
at least four sets of interests: client interests, a broad 
understanding of the representative’s self-interests (that may 
include, but are not limited to, interests vis-à-vis the 
representative negotiator’s bargaining opposite), ethical interests 
and the public’s interests. 
A. CLIENT INTERESTS 
1. INTERESTS OF THE REPRESENTATIVE’S CLIENT 
On any lawyering model, the representative’s client maintains 
one of, and typically the primary set of interests in the 
relationship.  This is the defining characteristic of the lawyer-
client relationship in the adversary system.17  In the context of 
negotiation, as Rubin and Sander point out, lawyer 
representatives bring to the table a particular “expertise” and a 
                                            
16 See e.g. supra Part II, note 15 and surrounding text. 
 
17 For an historic treatment of the adversary system – and the lawyer’s role in 
that system – that remains very helpful today, see Lon L. Fuller, “The 
Adversary System” [“The Adversary System”] in Harold J. Berman, ed., Talks 
on American Law (New York: Vintage Books, 1961) at 32. 
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“tactical flexibility” to be used to the benefit of the client.18  
Further, according to Pruitt, the “essence of the representative 
effect” under the boundary-role position in negotiation “is 
trying to please one’s constituent”19 (a task that is obviously 
directly dependant on the client’s interests).  Therefore, as Pruitt 
further argues, “It follows that bargainers who are 
representatives will usually be less conciliatory than those who 
are negotiating on their own behalf” and, subject to contrary 
instructions from the client, “representatives tend to view their 
constituents as desiring a tough, nonconciliatory approach to 
bargaining of the kind that is produced by a win/lose 
orientation.”20  Here we see ourselves largely back to the 
“zealous advocate” tendency that foregrounds the interests of 
the client typically to the exclusion of essentially everything 
else. 
This model is further articulated in the negotiation context by 
Robert Cochran, who argues that not only should 
representatives tend to “please” the client, they should also 
afford a significant amount of deference to the client’s choices in 
all aspects of the lawyering process.21  When looking at the 
                                            
18 “When Should We Use Agents?”, supra note 6 at 502-503 (cited to 
Negotiation and Settlement Advocacy, supra note 2).  See further Mediating 
Justice, supra note 3 at 136-147. 
 
19 Negotiation Behavior, supra note 9 at 501 (cited to Negotiation and 
Settlement Advocacy, supra note 2). 
 
20 Ibid.  Because of this tendency, Pruitt argues in favour of representatives 
being fully informed of their clients’ actual – rather than perceived – interests 
when approach negotiations.  See ibid.  See further the findings of David A. 
Lax and James K. Sebenius, “Negotiating Through an Agent” (1991) 35 J. of 
Conf. Resol. 474. 
 
21 Robert Cochran, “Legal Representation and the Next Steps Toward Client 
Control: Attorney Malpractice for Failure to Allow the Client to Control 
Negotiation and Pursue Alternatives to Litigation” (1990) 47 Wash. & Lee L. 
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question of “what choices the client should make”, Cochran 
answers by advocating that “courts [should] require lawyers to 
allow clients to make those choices which a reasonable person, 
in what the lawyer knows or should know to be the position of 
the client, would want to make.”22  Here again we see a strong 
preference for the client’s interest as the keystone to the 
relationship. 
So any model of the role of lawyer-as-negotiator must find a 
central position for the client’s interests.  However, the problem 
with models that focus essentially exclusively on the client’s 
interests is that they are not accurate or honest in their 
description of what is in reality actually at play in the minds of 
representative negotiators, nor do they account for the fact that 
representative negotiators do not, and often should not, 
necessarily align their interests with those of their clients (or 
forgo their or other interests) in the spirit of zealous advocacy.23  
I can say with first-hand experience—as a litigator and 
negotiator turned academic—that as a conceptual matter, there 
are more interests at play than only those of the client.  And as a 
practical matter, privileging the interests of the client does not 
always sit well with representative negotiators.   
An example from a recent negotiation class illustrates these 
concerns.  In an animated debrief portion of an in-class mock 
negotiation that I recently conducted involving the intellectual 
property rights to artistic materials of the negotiating parties, a 
                                                                                                            
Rev. 819 [“Legal Representation and the Next Steps Toward Client Control”], 
cited in Negotiation and Settlement Advocacy, supra note 2 at 539. 
 
22 Ibid. 
 
23 For a useful discussion on the diverging interests of principals and agents 
generally, see Jeswald W. Salacuse, “Law and Power in Agency 
Relationships” in Negotiating on Behalf of Others, supra note 6 at 157. 
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student of mine—after reflecting on the difficulty of maintaining 
a negotiation relationship with the other side as well as 
maintaining any sense of personal integrity vis-à-vis a very 
difficult position she was being asked to advance on behalf of 
her client—stated in shear frustration: “we started from a 
ridiculous position: our client simply wanted too much.  Her 
position was [] crazy.”  The student’s frustration resulted in a 
significant discussion about the role of the lawyer generally, and 
the lawyer-as-negotiator in particular.  The easy response to her 
concerns was that she was her client’s agent, and she could 
either conduct the negotiation or get off the file.24  However, 
that model—the simple agency model of lawyering that 
essentially backgrounds all other interests in favour of strong 
client autonomy—did not sit at all well with her.  Advancing 
instructions that in her view were “ridiculous” and “crazy” did 
not leave my student with either a good feeling about the 
specific case or about her general role as a representative 
negotiator.  For her, notwithstanding her role as a lawyer-
negotiator, there was clearly more at stake. 
Overly client-centric visions of the role of representative 
negotiator, like the model advanced by Cochran, do not help 
with this frustration, which belies interests at play other than 
those of the client.  So the question then becomes: Do we need 
to live with that frustration?  Is the zealous advocate view of the 
world the right (or only) one, particularly in light of concerns 
that leave the representative feeling frustrated, inadequate and 
perhaps hamstrung regarding potential alternative approaches 
and solutions?  Because there are clearly interests other than 
those of the client that need to be recognized, the answer to this 
question, in my view, must be no.  Before getting to some 
objections to this position,25 and further, to a set of interests 
                                            
24 For a brief discussion on the issue of withdrawal, see infra note 65. 
 
25 See e.g. infra Part IV. 
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involving the various potential self-interests of the 
representative negotiator that were at stake in my student’s 
role-play example, I briefly (below) identify another set of client 
interests: those of the opposing client. 
2. OTHER CLIENT’S INTERESTS 
Because this article deals with the mindset of the representative 
negotiator (and not specifically the mindset of principles), I do 
not spend much time here on the interests of the other side.  
Thinking about the interests of negotiation principals—by 
identifying, maximizing and/or minimizing mutual interests, 
creating space for mutual gains, value creating and value 
claiming, etc.—are important tools that are discussed 
elsewhere.26  However, it is obviously important—when 
thinking about the competing interests at stake in the mind of 
the representative lawyer—to make sure that the other side’s 
interests, in addition to interests vis-à-vis the bargaining 
opposite27—are on the table. 
The typical lawyer-client relationship militates against any 
responsibility of the lawyer for the interests of the other side.  
Further, zealous advocacy models expressly reject such 
concerns.  And my point here is not at all to say that the lawyer 
negotiator is now responsible for the other side’s interests, 
particularly when s/he is also represented.  However, to the 
extent that alternative negotiation models are considered—for 
example strong cooperative models that actively include the 
other side’s interests in the spirit of maintaining future 
relationships and mutual gains28 or hybrid models that 
                                                                                                            
 
26 See e.g. the literature identified supra at note 4. 
 
27 Discussed infra in Part III.B.1. 
 
28 For a typical example of this approach, see Getting to Yes, supra note 4. 
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contemplate the balance of value creation and value claiming29—
consideration for the other side’s interests must at least be 
considered and discussed with the representative’s client.  And 
in any event, regardless of which negotiation model one follows, 
modern ethical codes are increasingly mandating consideration 
of the other side in the context of truth-telling and fair play.30   
B. REPRESENTATIVE NEGOTIATOR’S SELF-INTERESTS 
Separate from client interests, there are a number of potential 
sets of self-interests at play for the representative in the 
negotiation process.  When thinking about these interests, it 
seems to me that there are two questions that need to be 
addressed: What kind of negotiator is the representative (hard, 
soft, principled, etc.)?  And what pecuniary and other self-
interests are at stake?  While the representative’s ethical 
interests could also be considered here, they are instead treated 
in a separate part of this article.31 
 1. REPRESENTATIVE NEGOTIATION STYLE 
On the first question, the negotiator must decide if s/he has the 
interest and/or skill to proceed with one or more negotiation 
style(s),32 and if so, whether negotiation style is a topic open for 
                                                                                                            
 
29 See e.g. Colleen M. Hanycz, “Introduction to the Negotiation Process 
Model”, supra note 4.  See further David A. Lax and James K. Sebenius, The 
Manager as Negotiator: Bargaining for Cooperation and Mutual Gain (New 
York: Free Press, 1986). 
 
30 Discussed infra in Part III.C.2. 
 
31 See infra Part III.C. 
 
32 For a discussion of different negotiation styles, see G. R. Williams, “Style 
and Effectiveness in Negotiation” in L. Hall, Negotiation: Strategies for 
Mutual Gain (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1993) at 156, in Dispute Resolution: 
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discussion with his or her client.  Some negotiators are of the 
view that they are unable to wear different negotiation “faces”.  
Again turning to examples from my teaching, several students 
have recently indicated to me—in the context of role-plays that 
require experimentation with different negotiation styles—that 
they feel very uncomfortable putting on a face or playing a role 
(the competitive negotiator, the cooperative negotiator, the bad 
cop, the tough guy, etc.) and that, in their view, their skills are 
maximized when they present themselves as an authentic and 
principled representative in all cases.  Drawing on personal 
practical experiences as a litigator and settlement counsel, these 
concerns resonate not only in the classroom but also amongst 
practicing representatives. 
These threshold concerns are typically dealt with ultimately on 
a calculus of competence and context.  To the extent that the 
lawyer representative and his or her client think that the 
lawyer’s chosen approach renders them competent for the 
negotiation, then all is well: proceeding on the basis of the 
lawyer’s preferred style, as discussed with the client, is the 
chosen course of instruction.  To the extent that is not the case, 
codes of conduct typically require the lawyer to get off the case 
and recommend another representative.  Further, in line with 
scholars who argue that some contexts—typically including one-
off personal injury cases—often lend themselves better to one 
negotiating style over another (competitive negotiation for 
example),33 it may be that the context of a certain case 
                                                                                                            
Readings and Case Studies, supra note 4 at 169.  See further Robert H. 
Mnookin, Scott R. Peppet and Andrew S. Tulumello, Beyond Winning: 
Negotiating to Create Value in Deals and Disputes (Cambridge, MA: Belknap 
Press, 2000) at 51-55 [Beyond Winning], Cheryl Picard et al., The Art and 
Science of Mediation (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2004) at 69-75. 
 
33 See e.g. Donald G. Gifford, “A Context-Based Theory of Strategy Selection 
in Legal Negotiation” (1985) 46 Ohio St. L.J. 41 [“A Context-Based Theory of 
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determines the required level of competency with a given style.  
Again, choices will be made at this threshold stage regarding the 
approach and the continued retainer. 
If the representative is competent to proceed with one or more 
of a variety of different styles, the issue then becomes one of 
ownership.  Who gets to choose with which style to proceed: the 
representative or his or her client?  Here we see the potential of 
an obvious conflict.  As Rubin and Sander discuss, there is often 
a potential conflict with a client’s instruction (for example to 
achieve the best possible outcome in a one-off negotiation 
through the use of a competitive approach) and the interest of a 
representative negotiator (who would prefer, for example, to 
retain a relationship with his or her bargaining opposite by using 
a cooperative approach).34  Similarly, the descriptions of both 
Gifford and Pruitt of the “boundary role position” of the lawyer-
as-negotiator result in the same potential competing interests 
between the representative and his or her client.35 
Now before I get into further discussion of this potential 
conflict, it should be recognized that even though the potential 
of competing interests exists, there does not necessarily need to 
be a conflict.  Clearly a good relationship between the 
representative negotiator and his or her bargaining opposite can 
                                                                                                            
Strategy Selection in Legal Negotiation”], cited in Negotiation and 
Settlement Advocacy, supra note 2 at 521. 
 
34 See “When Should We Use Agents?”, supra note 6 at 505 (cited to 
Negotiation and Settlement Advocacy, supra note 2). 
 
35 See “The Synthesis of Legal Counseling and Negotiating Models”, supra 
note 5 at 835; Negotiating Behavior, supra note 9 at 500 (cited to Negotiation 
and Settlement Advocacy, supra note 2).  See also Negotiation and 
Settlement Advocacy, supra note 2 at 498, Mediation and Negotiation, supra 
note 3 at 75. 
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militate to the benefit of both the representative lawyer and his 
or her client.  As Gifford recognizes, negotiating fairly with the 
other side does not mean a “selling-out” of the client’s 
interests.36  Similarly, Pruitt argues that developing relationships 
with the other side can help both with the client’s immediate 
outcome as well as potentially with future negotiations: 
“Because they communicate with one another over a period of 
time and share similar organizational positions, representatives 
often develop ties to one another.  These ties can contribute to 
the reconciliation of conflicts that would otherwise be 
intractable.”37 
However, when interests do not align, the potential of conflict 
between the representative and his or her client is real (and very 
typical).  In these circumstances, the client-centered “zealous 
advocate” model advocates for the backgrounding of the 
representative’s interests in favour of the client’s preferences.  
This view of the negotiator’s role fits Robert Cochran’s model.  
For Cochran, if the representative lawyer were of the view that a 
cooperative approach was appropriate but the client preferred a 
competitive approach (perhaps in the context of a one-off real 
estate purchase for the client who does not anticipate being in a 
similar market position again), the client’s preferences should 
prevail.  According to Cochran, regardless of the lawyer’s 
preference vis-à-vis his or her bargaining opposite, the client has 
a “right to choose the negotiating style.”38 
                                            
36 “The Synthesis of Legal Counseling and Negotiating Models”, supra note 5 
at 837.  See further the discussion of Gifford’s point, infra at note 106. 
 
37 Negotiation Behavior, supra note 9 at 500 (cited to Negotiation and 
Settlement Advocacy, supra note 2). 
 
38 See “Legal Representation and the Next Steps Toward Client Control”, 
supra note 21 at 540 (cited to Negotiation and Settlement Advocacy, supra 
note 2).  For a useful discussion regarding the importance of context regarding 
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 On the traditional lawyer-client relationship model, this 
view is not controversial.  In fact, it is still largely the dominant 
view.39  The lawyer’s role is to carry out the wishes of his or her 
client—period.  As the argument goes, any other view of the role 
of the lawyer usurps a meaningful sense of client autonomy; and 
further, particularly given the power (and virtual monopoly) that 
lawyers have over the provision of increasingly essential legal 
services, any other view would essentially create an all-powerful 
oligarchy of lawyers.40  The problem with this unsubtle view of 
legal representation, however, is that it is not fully supported in 
the literature or in codes of conduct,41 and further, it ignores the 
daily reality of the negotiation process.  Of course 
representatives will have interests.  And so the question 
becomes: Why should those interests always take a back seat, 
particularly in cases—like the one involving my student—in 
which a client’s position is “ridiculous”?  In these 
circumstances, should a lawyer be obligated to ignore his or her 
own views and interests and advance a “ridiculous” position?  
My view is that such an argument disingenuously ignores the 
                                                                                                            
the choice of negotiation style and strategy, see “A Context-Based Theory of 
Strategy Selection in Legal Negotiation”, supra note 33. 
 
39 See e.g. infra notes 59-60 and surrounding text. 
 
40 Because I have written elsewhere on these arguments – see infra note 58 – I 
will not take them up further here.  For a useful account of this argument, 
see e.g. Rob Atkinson, “How the Butler Was Made To Do It: The Perverted 
Professionalism of The Remains of the Day” (1995) 105 Yale L.J. 177 at 189 
(footnote omitted) [“How the Butler Was Made To Do It”], in which he 
argues: “The lawyer’s job is to advise the client, faced with a bafflingly 
complex legal order…Not to assist the client in exercising autonomy up to 
the very margin allowed by law would be to usurp the role not just of judge 
and jury, but of the legislature as well.  Ultimately, it would undermine the 
legitimacy of government itself.” 
 
41 See infra notes 66-70 and surrounding text. 
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reality of what actually goes on in the world of negotiations; 
argues for an impoverished view of lawyering that does not 
make room for a representative’s own views, interests and 
experiences in a given situation that may, at the end of the day, 
work to the benefit of the client’s cause;42 and ultimately 
cheapens the overall negotiation process to one that alienates 
negotiators—like my student—who are looking for a meaningful 
place to practice their skills in a professional, reasonable and 
fulfilling way.  Further, to the extent that codes of conduct 
prohibit the advancement of “frivolous”43 or “useless legal 
proceedings”,44 query whether advancing a “ridiculous” position 
amounts to unprofessional conduct. 
The boundary-role position approach described by scholars like 
Pruitt and Gifford allow for the reality of potentially competing 
interests in the mind of the representative negotiator that 
zealous advocacy models tend to ignore.  So when thinking 
about the potential interests at stake when preparing for a 
negotiation, the boundary-role position approach paints a more 
realistic landscape for the representative negotiator.  At least 
now the tension in my student’s mind has a voice and a place in 
the dialogue of negotiation preparation.  And by actively 
recognizing these potentially competing interests, the lawyer 
                                            
42 I have been influenced here by Allan C. Hutchinson, Legal Ethics and 
Professional Responsibility, 2d ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2006). 
 
43 American Bar Association (“ABA”), Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
(Model Rules) (2006 ed.), online: ABA 
<http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/mrpc_toc.html> at r. 3.1. 
 
44 The Canadian Bar Association (“CBA”), Code of Professional Conduct 
(CPC) (adopted by council, August 2004 and February 2006), online: CBA 
<http://www.cba.org/CBA/activities/pdf/codeofconduct06.pdf> at ch. III(6).  
See similarly the Law Society of Upper Canada (“LSUC”), Rules of 
Professional Conduct (RPC) (in effect 1 November 2000, as amended), online: 
LSUC <http://www.lsuc.on.ca/regulation/a/profconduct/> r. 2.02(2). 
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can strategize about how to resolve them.45  In a purely zealous 
advocacy model, these considerations are left off the table (or are 
at least the elephants in the room that no one is meant to talk 
about).   
So far we have identified the client’s interests and the 
representative’s self-interests largely relating to negotiation 
styles vis-à-vis his or her bargaining opposite.  It is with these 
interests that the current boundary role position schools of 
thought leave us.  And because they consider all of these 
interests, and not simply the client’s interests, they are an 
improvement on the typically one-dimensional client-centered 
views of the zealous advocate.  However, there are other 
interests at stake that still need to be considered as part of the 
representative’s self-interests as well as other interests involving 
ethics and the public.46 
2. PECUNIARY AND OTHER SELF-INTERESTS 
In addition to style and the representative’s reputation vis-à-vis 
his or her bargaining opposite, there are other potentially thorny 
self-interests at stake—particularly when negotiating 
settlements in the context of litigation—that should be 
identified and put on the table as issues to be acknowledged and 
considered when preparing for a representative negotiation.  So 
the second question that needs to be asked under this discussion 
of the representative negotiator’s self-interests is: What 
pecuniary and other self-interests are at stake (and what is s/he 
willing to do about them)? 
                                            
45 For a discussion about potentially irreconcilably competing interests, see 
infra Part IV. 
 
46 Discussed infra in Parts III.C-D. 
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Wiggins and Lowry have articulated that negotiating attorneys 
and their clients “are like allies in warfare.  Outwardly they may 
have an identity of goals and are bound together by professional 
obligations; yet internally they may have divergent interests and 
inconsistent long term objectives.”47  A number of potential 
conflicting interests arise in these circumstances.  For example, 
to the extent that a piece of litigation is worth much more to 
the lawyer as a going concern as opposed to a settled case, there 
are incentives to keep the case alive and advise against 
settlement.48  Along these lines, the lawyer-as-potential-
settlement-negotiator may also be much less risk averse when it 
comes to recommending trial over settlement, given potential 
desires for trial experience, exposure to the press, significant 
contingency fee rewards (which admittedly can cut both ways), 
and/or internal firm or community respect for being a tough, 
court-ready litigator (that also may be based, at least in 
tournament discourse, on the desire to be thought of as 
“partnership material”49).  The choice of payment structures—
for example percentage of outcome vs. hourly rate—may also 
                                            
47 Negotiation and Settlement Advocacy, supra note 2 at 517. 
 
48 For a brief discussion on this issue, see Mediation and Negotiation, supra 
note 3 at 75. 
 
49 For a general discussion of tournament theory in the context of law firm 
hierarchies and decision-making processes, see e.g. Marc Galanter and 
Thomas Palay, Tournament of Lawyers: The Transformation of the Big Law 
Firm (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1991).  For a 
critique of this discussion, see e.g. David B. Wilkins and G. Mitu Gulati, 
“Reconceiving the Tournament of Lawyers: Tracking, Seeding, and 
Information Control in the Internal Labor Markets of Elite Law Firms” (1998) 
84 Va. L. Rev. 1581. 
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impact on a representative’s interests vis-à-vis approaching a 
negotiation.50 
The underlying interests that raise these concerns are real and 
should be put on the table and considered in the context of full, 
sophisticated negotiation preparations.  And typically there are 
solutions.  Unlike self-interests based on the representative’s 
reputation, purely financial self-interests are relatively easy to 
deal with.  Codes of conduct typically paint rather bright 
conflict of interest lines in these areas that allow (or require) the 
lawyer, after recognizing the issues, to background his or her 
financial interests in the spirit of the very notion of lawyering 
itself.51  When it comes to some of the other, more personal or 
subtle concerns—undiluted focus on the trial process, a need to 
maintain a tough and ready litigation pose, etc.—there are other 
solutions, in addition to codes of conduct that require attorneys 
                                            
50 Some of these concerns are contemplated in Negotiation and Settlement 
Advocacy, supra note 2 at 517, “When Should We Use Agents?”, supra note 6 
at 505 (cited to Negotiation and Settlement Advocacy, supra note 2), Samuel 
R. Gross and Kent D. Syverud, “Getting to No: A Study of Settlement 
Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial” (1991) 90 Mich. L. Rev. 319 
[“Getting to No”], in Negotiation and Settlement Advocacy, supra note 2 at 
525, Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Andrew T. Guzman, “How Would You Like 
to Pay for That?  The Strategic Effects of Fee Arrangements on Settlement 
Terms” (1996) 1 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 53, in Negotiation and Settlement 
Advocacy, supra note 2 at 553, Herbert M. Kritzer, “Fee Arrangements and 
Negotiation” (1987) 21 Law & Soc. Rev. 341, in Negotiation and Settlement 
Advocacy, supra note 2 at 552. 
 
51 See e.g. Model Rules, supra note 43 at r. 1.8, CPC, supra note 44 at ch. VI.  
Further, as Chornenki and Hart argue, “Good lawyers…recognize their 
natural self-interest on the matter of fees, particularly in contingency cases, 
and deal with the matter as clearly and comprehensively as they can.”  
Genevieve A. Chornenki and Christine E. Hart, Bypass Court: A Dispute 
Resolution Handbook, 3d ed. (Canada: LexisNexis, 2005) at 142 [Bypass 
Court]. 
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to consider settlement,52 to assist with potentially competing 
interests.  For example, the use of parallel settlement counsel as 
a way not to distract the focused litigator from his or her 
endgame is a process—based on the literature53 and on my first-
hand experience with the use of settlement counsel in complex 
civil litigation settlements—that can work quite effectively. 
Complicating (and clouding) these potential conflicting interests 
is the lawyer’s inability to understand, or willful blindness to, 
what the client’s interests (and other interests) actually are at 
the outset, as opposed to what s/he assumes (or wants) them to 
be.  As Leonard Riskin recognized, the traditional zealous 
advocate tendency—based on the “lawyer’s standard 
philosophical map”—blinds the lawyer to a number of things 
including the potential needs of the client that may not be 
“legally meaningful”, including many non-financial issues 
relating to “honor, respect, dignity, security, and love…”54  To 
assist with this impoverished tendency of the traditional 
advocate, particularly in favour of promoting the benefits of 
mediation, Riskin argues in favour of expanding the traditional 
map.  All interests, and not simply those located on the 
adversarial map, need to be taken into account and understood 
as part of the lawyer’s role as a representative.  As I have 
recently argued elsewhere, education, an open-mindset, and a 
                                            
52 See e.g. CPC, supra note 44 at ch. III(6). 
 
53 See e.g. William F. Coyne, Jr., “The Case for Settlement Counsel” (1999) 14 
Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 367.  See also James Freund, “Bridging Troubled 
Waters: Negotiating Disputes” (1985-1986) Litigation 43, in Negotiation and 
Settlement Advocacy, supra note 2 at 520. 
 
54 Leonard Riskin, “Mediation and Lawyers” (1982) 43 Ohio St. L.J. 29 at 44 
[“Mediation and Lawyers”].  See also “Teaching Negotiators to Analyze 
Conflict Structure and Anticipate the Consequences of Principle-Agent 
Relationships”, supra note 6. 
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shift in the adversarial culture are all already leading to these 
ideals becoming more of a reality.55 
C. REPRESENTATIVE LAWYER’S ETHICAL INTERESTS 
According to a March 2006 statement by Brian A. Tabor, Q.C., 
President of the CBA: “Standards of professional ethics form the 
backdrop for everything lawyers do.”56  As such, any model of 
lawyering—including lawyers as negotiators—must actively 
embrace interests of an ethical nature.  Therefore, in addition to 
reputational, pecuniary and other self-interests, there are also 
significant (potentially related) ethical interests of the 
representative negotiator that need to be carefully considered in 
the context of developing the negotiator-as-professional model.  
There are two points of discussion here.  The first, fundamental 
point deals with the relevance of the representative negotiator’s 
own moral code.  The second point deals with other ethical 
interests at play in a representative negotiation. 
1. WHAT KIND OF LAWYER IS THE REPRESENTATIVE 
NEGOTIATOR? 
The basic question that I am interested in here is: What kind of 
lawyer is the representative negotiator?  Is s/he a zealous 
advocate driven solely by his or her client’s self-interest; or is 
s/he an agent whose moral outlook also counts in the calculus of 
the principal-agent relationship, particularly regarding the kinds 
of cases s/he takes, the results s/he seeks and the tools s/he 
                                            
55 See Trevor C. W. Farrow, “Globalizing Approaches to Legal Education and 
Training: Canada to Japan” (2005) 38 Hosei Riron J. of L. & Pol. 144, 
“Dispute Resolution and Legal Education: A Bibliography”, supra note 4, 
“Dispute Resolution, Access to Civil Justice and Legal Education”, supra 
note 4, “Thinking About Dispute Resolution”, supra note 4. 
 
56 See CPC, supra note 44 at “President’s Message”. 
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uses?  This question—that goes to the heart of professionalism 
itself—has been nicely framed by Rob Atkinson: “Should a 
professional always do all that the law allows, or should the 
professional recognize other constraints, particularly concerns 
for the welfare of third parties?  This question divides scholars of 
legal ethics and thoughtful practitioners into two schools: those 
who recognize constraints other than law’s outer limit, and 
those who do not.”57 
Because I have written elsewhere on this topic relating to 
lawyers generally,58 I will only briefly develop the basic issues 
here as they relate specifically to the representative negotiator.  
As a preliminary matter, there continue to be strong arguments 
for following Atkinson’s second school: what counts is what is 
legal, and non-legal considerations—including a lawyer’s 
personal ethical interests—are not relevant in terms of the 
lawyer’s representation of his or her client.  Traditional and still 
dominant views of the lawyer’s role as a zealous advocate—as 
reinforced by codes of conduct59 and academic literature 
                                            
57 “How the Butler Was Made To Do It”, supra note 40 at 184 (footnote 
omitted). 
 
58 See Trevor C. W. Farrow, “A Defense of the Moral Lawyer” (in progress). 
 
59 See e.g. Model Rules, supra note 43 at Preamble, para. 2 (“…As advocate, a 
lawyer zealously asserts the client’s position under the rules of the adversary 
system”), CPC, supra note 44 at ch. IX (rule) (“When acting as an advocate, 
the lawyer must…represent the client resolutely, honourably and within the 
limits of the law”).  See further RPC, supra note 44 at r. 4.01, commentary 
(“The lawyer has a duty to the client to raise fearlessly every issue, advance 
every argument, and ask every question, however distasteful, which the 
lawyer thinks will help the client’s case and to endeavour to obtain for the 
client the benefit of every remedy and defence authorized by law”, and 
further, “When acting as an advocate, a lawyer should refrain from expressing 
the lawyer’s personal opinions on the merits of a client’s case”). 
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regarding the lawyer’s role in general60 and the negotiator’s role 
in particular61—support this school of thought. 
The problem is that, notwithstanding this dominant school of 
thought, some representative negotiators, as a practical matter, 
are persuaded by Atkinson’s other school of thought: that non-
legal considerations—again including a lawyer’s personal ethical 
interests—should not be irrelevant.  Again drawing on examples 
from my teaching, many students are uncomfortable with the 
notion of negotiating deals, the underlying ethical consequences 
of which they fundamentally disagree with.62  For instance, 
                                                                                                            
 
60 See e.g. “The Adversary System”, supra note 17, Charles Fried, “The 
Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation” 
(1976) 85 Yale L.J. 1060, Monroe H. Friedman, Lawyers’ Ethics in an 
Adversary System (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1975).  For a very useful 
debate on the limits of the adversarial system and the role of the lawyer, see 
Stephen L. Pepper, “The Lawyer’s Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A 
Problem, and Some Possibilities” (1986) American Bar Foundation Research J. 
613, David Luban, “The Lysistratian Prerogative: A Response to Stephen 
Pepper” (1986) American Bar Foundation Research J. 637 [“The Lysistratian 
Prerogative”], Andrew L. Kaufman, “A Commentary on Pepper’s ‘The 
Lawyer’s Amoral Ethical Role’” (1986) American Bar Foundation Research J. 
651, all cited in Andrew L. Kaufman and David B. Wilkins, eds., Problems in 
Professional Responsibility for a Changing Profession, 4th ed. (Durham: 
Carolina Academic Press, 2002) [Professional Responsibility for a Changing 
Profession] at 219-244.  See also Stephen L. Pepper, “A Rejoinder to 
Professors Kaufman and Luban” (1986) American Bar Foundation Research J. 
657, Abe Krash, “Professional Responsibility to Clients and the Public 
Interest: Is There a Conflict?” (1974) 55 Chicago Bar Record 31 [“Professional 
Responsibility to Clients and the Public Interest”] in Professional 
Responsibility for a Changing Profession, supra at 445. 
 
61 See e.g. “Legal Representation and the Next Steps Toward Client Control”, 
supra note 21. 
 
62 Such examples include the following hypothetical negotiations.  (1) A rich, 
speculative, private land developer asks you to negotiate a deal with a slum 
landlord over the purchase of a fully-functioning low income rental facility 
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going back to my original example of the negotiation student 
who was representing a client with “ridiculous” and “crazy” 
instructions in an hypothetical role-play, when pushed in the 
de-brief session on whether she would take that case, she 
responded: “I’m not sure, if I had a choice, that I would work for 
someone [like my client in the negotiation]…she’s an 
egomaniac.”   
Fortunately, representative negotiators do have a choice.  So the 
question then becomes: Why should we pursue a model of 
professionalism that requires representative negotiators to 
negotiate deals on behalf of their clients that they would never 
negotiate for themselves or in any event that they think are 
“ridiculous”?  The answer in my view is that we should not.  
Clearly there are times, particularly after a retainer has been 
accepted and negotiations are under way, when the lawyer may 
be asked to take positions professionally that s/he would not 
take personally.63  But these situations aside, there are many 
occasions when the lawyer’s interests and views should be 
voiced in the spirit of improving the underlying cause as well as 
                                                                                                            
that currently houses 80 families in favour of its demolition and replacement 
with a high-end multi-use condo facility that would house 8 high income 
families. (I have been influenced by Duncan Kennedy regarding this 
hypothetical.  See Duncan Kennedy, “The Responsibility of Lawyers for the 
Justice of Their Causes” (1987) 18 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 1157 [“The 
Responsibility of Lawyers for the Justice of Their Causes”].)  (2) The CEO of a 
large privately-held downsizing transnational security firm asks you to 
negotiate a deal that would result in the termination of all employees of the 
Jewish or Muslim faith, based on your client’s unfounded occupational 
requirement theory that these employees, while “good people”, simply pose 
to much of a reputational and security risk (in terms of attacks against 
security officers in the field) and therefore are too costly to the firm. 
 
63 For a general discussion, see e.g. “The Responsibility of Lawyers for the 
Justice of Their Causes”, supra note 62.  See also the brief discussion on the 
topic of the timing of withdrawal, infra at note 65. 
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the overall system, notwithstanding an individual client’s initial 
desires.  In this spirit, Allan Hutchinson, for example, argues for 
a model that does not require lawyers “to forgo moral 
judgment”, for to do otherwise reduces them to “amoral 
technicians with significant drawbacks and limitations…”64  
What this looks like in practice is making choices about what 
negotiations a representative takes, and what tools and 
negotiation styles they are willing to use once a client is taken 
on.  Of course this is all done with the client’s knowledge and 
instructions.  And if instructions are not forthcoming, the 
lawyer should get off the file.65 
Before we dismiss all of this as moral meandering without a 
sound basis in legal policy, we should also recognize that 
professional codes of conduct—as supported by competing 
academic literature66—support the relevance of a lawyer’s 
                                            
64 Allan C. Hutchinson, “Legal Ethics for a Fragmented Society: Between 
Professional and Personal” (1997) 5 Int’l J. of the Legal Prof. 175 [“Legal 
Ethics for a Fragmented Society”], in Janet Walker, gen. ed., The Civil 
Litigation Process: Cases and Materials, 6th ed. (Toronto: Emond 
Montgomery, 2005) at 157 [The Civil Litigation Process]. 
 
65 It is acknowledged that getting off a file is more difficult, although certainly 
not impossible, once a negotiation has commenced or is imminent.  Ideally, 
then, if withdrawal is seen as an option, it should occur with the client’s 
consent, or at least with the client’s full knowledge, as soon as possible in the 
life of the representative-client relationship prior to a negotiation. 
 
66 See e.g. “The Responsibility of Lawyers for the Justice of Their Causes”, 
supra note 62, “Legal Ethics for a Fragmented Society”, supra note 64, 
“Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation”, supra note 5.  See also Richard 
Wasserstrom, “Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues” (Fall 1975) 5 
Human Rights 1, in Problems in Professional Responsibility for a Changing 
Profession, supra note 60 at 4, “The Lysistratian Prerogative”, supra note 60, 
Murray L. Schwartz, “The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers” 
(1978) 66 Cal. L. Rev. 669 at 671.  See also ibid. at 690-695, where Schwartz 
argues, among other things, that in lawyering situations in which arbiters are 
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morality, sense of justice, honour and ethics.  For example, 
according to the preamble and scope of the Model Rules: “…The 
Rules do not…exhaust the moral and ethical considerations that 
should inform a lawyer, for no worthwhile human activity can 
be completely defined by legal rules.”67  According to the CPC: 
the “lawyer should not hesitate to speak out against an 
injustice.”68  Similar considerations regarding the relevance of 
broad notions of morality and honour obtain in various regional 
jurisdictions.  For example, according to The Lawyer’s Code of 
Professional Responsibility (LCPR) of the New York State Bar 
Association (“NYSBA”), “A lawyer should be temperate and 
dignified, and refrain from all illegal and morally reprehensible 
conduct.”69  Further, according to the preface of the Code of 
Professional Conduct of the Law Society of Alberta (“LSA”): 
“…the rules and regulations…cannot exhaustively cover all 
situations that may confront a lawyer, who may find it 
necessary to also consider…general moral principles in 
determining an appropriate course of action.”70 
                                                                                                            
not present – expressly invoking the lawyer’s role as a “negotiator” or 
“counselor” – the “non-advocate lawyer should be held morally accountable 
for assistance rendered the client even though the lawyer is neither legally 
nor professionally accountable.” 
 
67 Model Rules, supra note 43 at Preamble, para. 16.  See also ibid. at paras. 7 
and 9. 
 
68 CPC, supra note 44 at ch. XIII.3. 
 
69 NYSBA, LCPR, Canon 1, EC 1-5, online: NYSBA 
<http://www.nysba.org/Content/NavigationMenu/Attorney_Resources/Ethic
s_Opinions/Lawyers_Code_of_Professional_Responsibility/CodeofResponsibi
lity.pdf>.  
 
70 LSA, Code of Professional Conduct, online: LSA 
<http://www.lawsocietyalberta.com/files/Code.pdf> at preface.  See further 
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Although not uncontroversial, there is therefore a tension even 
within the various codes of conduct between the responsibility 
zealously to represent a client and the potential role for the 
lawyer’s own ethical interests, whether based on morality, a 
sense of honour or some other social norm.  Regardless, there is 
clearly a basis for the relevance of—and in my view an 
overriding professional obligation at least to consider—the 
lawyer’s own ethical interests in the context of his or her role as 
a representative negotiator. 
As such, these interests—which are not recognized by either the 
simple client-centered models or the more expanded boundary 
role position models of representative negotiation—should be 
recognized as interests that influence the lawyering and 
negotiation processes and, as such, need to be on the table for 
discussion when the negotiator-as-professional sits down to 
prepare for the representative negotiation process.  The end 
calculus becomes a discussion between the representative 
lawyer and his or her client.71  The final decision of whether to 
stay with the representative always rests with the client.  But 
the fundamental decisions regarding whether and how the 
negotiation is handled are also decisions regarding which the 
lawyer should have determining input.  Any other model, in my 
view, not only turns a blind eye to reality, but also impoverishes 
the responsibilities and possibilities of the representative’s role. 
                                                                                                            
RPC, supra note 44 at r. 4.01(2)(b) that, although pitched to lawyers in their 
capacity as advocates, provides: “…a lawyer shall not…knowingly assist or 
permit the client to do anything that the lawyer considers to 
be…dishonourable…” 
 
71 For support for this active approach, see e.g. “Toward Another View of 
Legal Negotiation”, supra note 5 at 813-817. 
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2. OTHER ETHICAL INTERESTS OF THE REPRESENTATIVE 
NEGOTIATOR 
In addition to the fundamental question of the relevance of the 
representative negotiator’s personal moral compass, there are 
other ethical issues that come up all the time in representative 
negotiations that need to be considered and discussed with the 
client.  Gifford, when discussing the boundary role position 
model, does contemplate the notion of professional 
responsibility in passing: 
When negotiating on behalf of the client…the lawyer 
is drawn in conflicting directions.  On the one hand, 
she is obligated professionally to obtain the most 
favorable settlement possible during the 
negotiations…On the other hand…he must respond to 
pressures from his negotiating counterparts…and 
pursue settlements that are fair and just to both 
parties.  The pressure on the lawyer to accommodate 
these tensions…results in part from the expectations 
of future contact with the other lawyers and in part 
from the traditional courtesy and fair play among 
lawyers.72 
While this is right, ethical considerations involve more than 
simply “courtesy and fair play among lawyers”.  Terms like 
“courtesy”, “fair play”, and—as Silver articulates, the “duty of 
‘good faith’ towards other counsel”73—are unlikely to be precise 
enough, or wide-reaching enough, to place adequate limits on 
“dishonest bargaining practices”74 and other such negotiation 
                                            
72 “The Synthesis of Legal Counseling and Negotiating Models”, supra note 5 
at 835-836 (emphasis added). 
 
73 Mediation and Negotiation, supra note 3 at 76-77. 
 
74 Ibid. 
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tactics.  What we are therefore talking about, in addition to “fair 
play”, etc., is a full range of ethical and professional 
considerations, including obligations of confidentiality, truth-
telling, the avoidance of conflicts of interest, and the like.  
Neither the client-centered model nor the boundary role 
position model adequately and expressly embraces a full 
consideration of the representative negotiator’s ethical 
considerations and interests.   
That is because, surprisingly, the consideration of ethics 
continues to be a relatively new issue in negotiation theory.  As 
Eleanor Norton comments, “There has been little evidence of or 
interest in coherent standards or express norms for appropriate 
behavior in negotiations.”75  Similarly, as Lynn Epstein 
comments: “Negotiations have always enjoyed a certain amount 
of protection from ethical constraints.  This protection is due to 
a longstanding tradition of allowing parties to negotiate freely, 
and without restrictions that encompass other aspects of legal 
representation.  Historically, this freedom surrounded most 
negotiations in a shroud of secrecy.”76  Although there is starting 
to be more focus recently on ethics and negotiation,77 Epstein’s 
                                                                                                            
 
75 Eleanor Holmes Norton, “Bargaining and the Ethics of Process” (1989) 64 
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 493 at 506 (footnote omitted) [“Bargaining and the Ethics of 
Process”], in Negotiation and Settlement Advocacy, supra note 2 at 594. 
 
76 Lynn A. Epstein, “Cyber E-Mail Negotiation vs. Traditional Negotiation: 
Will Cyber Technology Supplant Traditional Means of Settling Litigation?” 
(2001) 36 Tulsa L.J. 839 at 845, in Negotiation and Settlement Advocacy, 
supra note 2 at 544. 
 
77 See e.g Carrie Menkel-Meadow and Michael Wheeler, eds., What’s Fair: 
Ethics for Negotiators (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2004), Phyllis E. 
Bernard and Bryant Garth, eds., Dispute Resolution Ethics: A Comprehensive 
Guide (Washington, DC: ABA, 2002), The Theory and Practice of 
Representative Negotiation, supra note 4, Dispute Resolution: Cases and 
Materials, supra note 4 at 258-280, Negotiation and Settlement Advocacy, 
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description still largely obtains.  Often when ethics are raised, it 
is typically done in passing,78 as an afterthought, or at least as a 
separate discussion that does not form part of the central make-
up of the representative negotiator’s very being as a 
professional.79 
                                                                                                            
supra note 2 at 497 and 589-645, Effective Legal Negotiation and Settlement, 
supra note 4 at ch. 17, Mediation and Negotiation, supra note 3 at 77, n. 15, 
Beyond Winning, supra note 32 at 274-294, Andrew J. Pirie, Alternative 
Dispute Resolution: Skills, Science, and the Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2000) 
at 122-124, Mediating Justice, supra note 3 at 136-146.  See further Stephen 
B. Goldberg, Frank E. A. Sander and Nancy H. Rogers, Dispute Resolution: 
Negotiation, Mediation, and Other Processes, 4th ed. (Gaithersburg, NY: 
Aspen, 2003) [Negotiation, Mediation, and Other Processes], Kimberlee K. 
Kovach, “Lawyer Ethics Must Keep Pace With Practice: Plurality in 
Lawyering Roles Demands Diverse and Innovative Ethical Standards” (2003) 
39 Idaho L. Rev. 399, Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., “The Lawyer’s Obligation to Be 
Trustworthy When Dealing With Opposing Parties” (1981) 33 S.C. L. Rev. 
181, Gary T. Lowenthal, “The Bar’s Failure to Require Truthful Bargaining By 
Lawyers” (1988) 2 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 411, David A. Lax and James K. 
Sebenius, “Three Ethical Issues in Negotiation” (1986) Neg. J. 363, James M. 
Bowie, “Ethical Issues in Construction Mediation: Are There Any Rules?” 
(2004) 24 Constr. Lawyer 33 at n. 1, J. Keith Murnighan, D. A. Cantelon and 
T. Elyashiv, Bounded Personal Ethics and the Tap Dance of Real Estate 
Agency, in J. A. Wagner III, J. M. Bartunek and K. D. Elsbach, eds., vol. 3, 
Advances in Qualitative Organizational Research (New York: Elsevier, 
2001) 1, noted in Negotiating on Behalf of Others, supra note 6 at 286-287. 
 
78 For example, in the index of a leading collection of essays on the issue of 
representative negotiation, the topic of “ethics” has only two references, both 
of which simply refer to discussions about agents’ ethics in passing (and 
neither of which is directly related to the ethical obligations of lawyers as 
representative negotiators).  See Negotiating on Behalf of Others, supra note 
6 at 320.  In another text on representation in mediation and negotiation, 
“ethics” had no references in the index.  See Mediation and Negotiation, 
supra note 3 at 199 (other than the term “good faith”, which had one entry, 
and has been discussed supra at note 73 and surrounding text). 
 
79 Although far from determinative evidence of the relative importance of 
legal ethics vis-à-vis other negotiation topics, in one of the leading casebooks 
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This inadequate treatment of ethics jeopardizes the adequate 
training, ethical preparation and professional conduct of 
representative negotiators.  As Wiggins and Lowry have argued, 
“there is a clear potential for conflict between the attorney’s 
own values and the perceived duty of single-minded zealous 
advocacy on behalf of the client’s interests.”80  Shockingly, this 
impoverished state of affairs—that results in a “confounding [of] 
the boundary of professional responsibility and negotiation 
ethics”—apparently makes it “difficult to…make prescriptive 
statements about truth telling and lawyers.”81  These 
acknowledgments amount, in my view, to a remarkably sad 
state of affairs.  If lawyers cannot be counted on, or at least 
mandated to tell the truth, who can?  What we are left with then 
is a relatively barren ethical terrain that leaves the 
representative negotiator without adequate guidance for ethical 
negotiation.82  Current practices encourage Gross and Syverud, 
                                                                                                            
on the subject of negotiation (Negotiation and Settlement Advocacy, supra 
note 2), the issue of ethics – although raised briefly in passing (see e.g. ibid. at 
497) – is raised in chapter 16 of 16 chapters.  Similarly, “Negotiation Ethics” 
is chapter 17 of 17 chapters in Effective Legal Negotiation and Settlement, 
supra note 4. 
 
80 Negotiation and Settlement Advocacy, supra note 2 at 589. 
 
81 Ibid. 
 
82 For professional obligation requirements, see e.g. Model Rules, supra note 
43 at Preamble, para. 2, which provides that “...As negotiator, a lawyer seeks 
a result advantageous to the client but consistent with requirements of 
honest dealings with others.”).  See also ibid. at r. 4.1.  For a summary and 
treatment of the Model Rules and proposals regarding negotiation and 
professionalism, see e.g. ABA, Standing Committee on Ethics and 
Professional Responsibility, “Lawyer’s Obligation of Truthfulness When 
Representing a Client in Negotiation: Application to Caucused Mediation” 
(Formal Ethics Opinion 06-439, 12 April 2006), Mediation and Negotiation, 
supra note 3 at 77.  For a background discussion, see Negotiation and 
Settlement Advocacy, supra note 2 at 597-600.  In Canada, see CPC, supra 
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for example, to ask questions such as: “Under what 
circumstances should a party make a sincere offer?  An 
outrageous demand?  An insincere threat to go to trial?”83  
Further, for example, Holmes comments that “the concept of 
truthfulness in negotiation raises unique ethical questions 
because in most circumstances candor is not necessarily 
required.”84  Silver articulates that representative lawyers “can 
be misleading, can bluff and can threaten action at will.”85  
Further, Boulle and Kelly argue that, even for lawyers governed 
by professional codes of conduct, “in negotiation…exaggeration 
and sheer puffery are tolerated.”86  As such, Wiggins and Lowry 
question whether “the profession should attempt to police lying 
in negotiation” at all.87 
In my view, this ethically questionable state of affairs in 
representative negotiation should not be tolerated, particularly 
                                                                                                            
note 44 at ch. III(7), which provides that: “When advising the client the 
lawyer must never knowingly assist in or encourage any dishonesty…”, and 
further ibid. at chs. I(5)(g), (h), and in the context of the lawyer as advocate, 
chs. IX(2)(e), (3).  See similarly RPC, supra note 44 at r. 2.02(5).  Compare 
LSA, Code of Professional Conduct, supra note 70 at ch. 11 (“The Lawyer as 
Negotiator”), which provides for a wide-ranging set of ethical prescriptions 
for lawyer negotiators.  For comment on the LSA’s position, see Mediation 
and Negotiation, supra note 3 at 77, n. 15. 
 
83 “Getting to No”, supra note 50 at 327. 
 
84 “Bargaining and the Ethics of Process”, supra note 75 at 508.  But compare 
Model Rules, supra note 43 at r. 4.1. 
 
85 Mediation and Negotiation, supra note 3 at 77. 
 
86 Laurence Boulle and Kathleen J. Kelly, Mediation: Principles, Processes, 
Practice, Cdn. ed. (Toronto and Vancouver: Butterworths, 1998) at 158. 
 
87 Negotiation and Settlement Advocacy, supra note 2 at 590. 
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for representative negotiators who are also members of the bar 
and subject to professional obligations.  The negotiator-as-
professional must actively embrace ethical problems, both in 
preparation with his or her client and then during the 
negotiation process itself.  And to the extent that a client seeks 
to foreground his or her personal interests over the ethical 
concerns and interests of the representative negotiator, that 
move must be either rejected through active discussions with 
the client—which often in any event work to the benefit of the 
client’s case88—or the lawyer must get off the file in accordance 
with principles of professionalism.  In my view there is no 
middle ground.  James White has argued that much of the 
difficulty in regulating negotiation behaviour comes from the 
fact that “negotiation is a non-public behaviour”.89  That may be 
right as a descriptive matter.  However, we do not seem to have 
an appetite for accepting borderline ethical behaviour in law’s 
public sphere.  We should be even less accommodating of such 
behaviour in the private sphere.90 
                                            
88 According to Corry, “If informal conferences [in the bargaining process] are 
to be successful…research has shown that…[t]he negotiator must speak 
truthfully in indicating areas of flexibility in the party’s position.”  The Art of 
Mutual Gains Bargaining, supra note 9 at 88.  See also Mediating Justice, 
supra note 3 at 139-146.  For a further treatment of the issue of discussing 
ethical issues “explicitly” with clients, see Beyond Winning, supra note 32 at 
284. 
 
89 James J. White, “Machiavelli and the Bar: Ethical Limitations on Lying in 
Negotiation” (1980) Am. Bar Found. Res. J. 926, in Negotiation and 
Settlement Advocacy, supra note 2 at 595. 
 
90 For support for this proposition, see e.g. LSA, Code of Professional 
Conduct, supra note 70 at ch. 11.  See also Model Rules, supra note 43 at 
Preamble, para. 2. 
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D. THE PUBLIC’S INTERESTS 
The fourth general set of interests at play in representative 
negotiations includes considerations of interest to the public.  
While notions of personal morality and ethical considerations91 
are bound up with notions of the public good, particularly in the 
context of the regulation of lawyers, a further question also 
needs to be considered: Should a representative negotiator 
consider, during deliberations with his or her client, the public 
worth of a given outcome of the negotiation process?  In my 
view, the answer is yes for the negotiator-as-professional. 
Here again traditional models of representative negotiation are 
either actively against these sorts of public-welfare 
considerations (based in zealous advocacy principles) or 
essentially silent.  A typical example of this opposition is the 
following statement by Abe Krash: a lawyer’s “views of the 
public interest are immaterial to his [or her] professional 
responsibility.”92  For Riskin, the basic reason for this opposition 
or silence is that models of lawyering that celebrate the zealous 
advocate blind the lawyer to, or mandate against, a number of 
considerations including “the overall social effect of a given 
result.”93   
In opposition to this indifference, Duncan Kennedy—on the 
theory that lawyers should “Try…[their] best…to avoid doing 
harm with…[their] lawyer skills”—argues that lawyers 
“shouldn’t take the case if…[they] think it would be better for 
                                            
91 See e.g. infra Part III.C. 
 
92 “Professional Responsibility to Clients and the Public Interest”, supra note 
60 at 449 (cited to Professional Responsibility for a Changing Profession, 
supra note 60). 
 
93 “Mediation and Lawyers”, supra note 54 at 44 (footnote omitted). 
 
36 CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES [VOL. 03 NO. 02 
 
society, or more moral, for the client to lose.”94  Similarly, Allan 
Hutchinson argues for a “fresh account of legal ethics [that] 
would…encourage lawyers to develop a critical morality that 
encompasses such pressing issues as ‘what kind of lawyer do I 
want to be?’ and ‘what interests am I going to spend my life 
serving as a lawyer?’”.95  Finally, at the 1971 “Excellence in 
Advocacy” program of the Advocacy Institute held in Ann 
Arbor, Michigan, the celebrated author Martin Mayer argued 
that: 
“[I]f lawyers cannot look at the society as a whole and 
say that certain aspects of their work…represent a plus 
for this society and for the world of our children, then 
they had better look to last-ditch defenses.  Better yet, 
lawyers should try to find a way to salvage what is 
worth doing out of their work and be influential in the 
production of what is going to happen next.”96 
Again, these are certainly not uncontroversial positions, 
particularly given the underpinnings of the dominant zealous 
advocate model located in strong notions of a freedom-seeking 
adversary system.  But they are positions, again, that certainly 
find support in current codes of conduct.  For example, the CBA 
states that the “primary concern” of the CPC is “the protection 
of the public interest.”97  Accordingly, “the lawyer should not 
                                            
94 “The Responsibility of Lawyers for the Justice of Their Causes”, supra note 
62 at 206-207 (cited to The Civil Litigation Process, supra note 64). 
 
95 “Legal Ethics for a Fragmented Society”, supra note 64 at 157 (cited to The 
Civil Litigation Process, supra note 64). 
 
96 Martin Mayer, “The Trial Lawyers” in Grace W. Holmes, ed., Excellence in 
Advocacy (Ann Arbor: The Institute of Continuing Legal Education, 1971) 51 
at 60. 
 
97 CPC, supra note 44 at Preface. 
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hesitate to speak out against an injustice.”98  So to the extent 
that a representative negotiator is being asked to take a position 
that s/he considers not to be in the “public interest” or that 
amounts to an “injustice” (terms that are not typically defined 
in codes of conduct), then s/he is professionally encouraged to 
seek alternative solutions and/or to “speak out”.  In my view 
these alternatives specifically include speaking out during 
negotiation preparation sessions with a client who is trying to 
advance a cause that amounts, in the eyes of the lawyer, to an 
“injustice”; or in the eyes of my negotiation student, to 
something that is “ridiculous”.  This will obviously be context 
and lawyer specific.  But that is OK.  And it is certainly not a 
reason to shy away from the opportunity to do good, or at least 
to avoid doing harm, with a representative’s negotiation skills.  
That is the opportunity and the responsibility, in my view, of 
the negotiator-as-professional. 
E. OTHER INTERESTS 
I have raised four basic sets of interests that I think must be 
considered by representative negotiators when approaching any 
given client’s retainer.  In addition, there may be other interests, 
including competing interests of various constituencies within a 
representative’s own client (like, for example, when negotiating 
labour issues on behalf of a trade union or land claim rights on 
behalf of a group of native bands), or competing public interests 
(like, for example, when negotiating on behalf of a coalition of 
community groups or public-interest NGOs) that are not easily 
reconciled during a representative’s contemplation of a given 
course of conduct.99  Often traditional conflict of interest rules 
                                                                                                            
 
98 CPC, supra note 44 at ch. XIII(3). 
 
99 For a consideration of negotiating in the context of potentially competing 
client interests, see “Teaching Negotiators to Analyze Conflict Structure and 
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will assist with these considerations.  However, in situations in 
which equally valid public interests are at stake, bona fide 
contextual and individual reflection may be the only available 
tool.  Further, client or representative interests regarding race, 
gender, culture and power may, and often do, significantly 
influence the negotiation process.100  Regardless of the interest or 
choice, the point here is that active consideration of and 
deliberation about all interests must occur. 
IV. POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS: ZEALOUS 
ADVOCACY AND CONFLICTING INTERESTS 
Perhaps the two biggest obstacles to my vision of the negotiator-
as-professional are both the dominant zealous advocate model 
itself and the potential of irreconcilably competing interests.  
Because I have already taken up objections from the zealous 
advocacy model in the context of representative negotiations,101 I 
do not address them further here, other than briefly to say the 
following.  There is no doubt that the arguments and 
considerations that I am advancing in this article are not 
supported by the still-dominant model of the zealous advocate.  
They are therefore neither uncontroversial nor unproblematic.  
However, because my vision of the lawyer-as-negotiator is 
supported, at least in part, from a theoretical perspective by both 
                                                                                                            
Anticipate the Consequences of Principle-Agent Relationships”, supra note 
6. 
 
100 There is a growing literature in the field of negotiation and dispute 
resolution dealing with all of these varied and important considerations.  For 
a recent collection of leading materials, see e.g. The Theory and Practice of 
Representative Negotiation, supra note 4.  See further Negotiation and 
Settlement Advocacy, supra note 2 at chs. 11-12, Dispute Resolution: 
Readings and Case Studies, supra note 4 at 180-215. 
 
101 See e.g. supra notes 58-60 and surrounding text. 
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the literature and aspects of current codes of conduct; and 
further, as a practical matter, by the intuitions and experiences 
of both experienced and novice negotiators, there is clearly both 
something lacking about the current models and something 
appealing about my alternative model.  So while I acknowledge 
the continued hurdles that dominant, zealous advocacy models 
put in the way of my arguments; because of their own problems, 
my view is that we need to continue to search for alternative 
models.  The negotiator-as-professional is one such alternative 
model that, in my view, does a better job of capturing both 
theoretical opportunities and practical realities of the 
representative negotiation process. 
Equally challenging to my arguments is a further question: What 
if the representative is not able to reconcile the competing 
interests in his or her mind in any given negotiation?  The 
simple answer to this question is: Just because the calculus is 
difficult does not mean that the lawyer shouldn’t engage in it.  
Resorting to the zealous advocate model for expediency reasons 
does not do justice either to it or to alternative models.  A 
slightly more compelling answer comes from the realm of 
professional responsibility: lawyers are bound to consider a 
broad conception of the competing interests at stake in a 
negotiation, both as a competence matter and as an ethical 
matter.  So professionally, the issue is likely closed.  However, 
this again does not really deal with the practical—and typical—
situation of competing interests.  What should the lawyer do? 
A typical situation involves a conflict between the interests of 
the representative’s client and interests vis-à-vis the 
representative’s bargaining opposite.102  This conflict –discussed 
                                            
102 See e.g. “When Should We Use Agents?”, supra note 6 at 505 (cited to 
Negotiation and Settlement Advocacy, supra note 2). 
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above103—is what Gifford and others identify as a “boundary-role 
conflict.”104  The obvious answer is to try to work out with the 
representative’s client—during the preparation stage—a solution 
that maximizes the potential of both interests.  For example, 
client’s often do not appreciate the power of a good relationship 
between negotiators.  Alternatively, they often do not realize, as 
generally discussed above,105 that a good relationship between 
negotiators does not mean that their interests are being 
somehow inadequately protected.106  This initial hard work with 
a representative’s client, with full disclosure of the 
representative’s views and interests, will typically resolve many 
of these conflicts.  However, if a solution cannot be worked out, 
one option—that I have argued against107—is Cochran’s 
preference for dominant client control.108  The alternative vision 
that I am suggesting is leaving significant control with the 
lawyer that may ultimately lead, in particularly tough 
situations, to a lawyer’s withdrawal from a case.  While an 
imperfect solution, it is a preferable solution to preferring a 
model that impoverishes the importance of other interests (a 
model that potentially forces the lawyer to check him or 
                                            
103 See generally supra Part II.B.1. 
 
104 See e.g. “The Synthesis of Legal Counseling and Negotiating Models”, 
supra note 5 at 836. 
 
105 See supra note 36 and surrounding text. 
 
106 For example, according to Gifford, “The lawyer’s role as a moderating 
influence does not necessarily mean that she is ‘selling-out’ the interests of 
her client.”  See “The Synthesis of Legal Counseling and Negotiating 
Models”, supra note 5 at 836-837.  See also supra note 36 and surrounding 
text. 
 
107 See e.g. supra note 41 and surrounding text. 
 
108 See supra note 38 and surrounding text. 
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herself—and his or her moral compass—at the door on arrival at 
work every morning).   
Again, the point of my model is not necessarily to solve all 
potentially thorny circumstances with a one-size-fits-all 
approach (that is one of the dangerously attractive features of 
the zealous advocate model).  No nuanced model or code, in my 
view, provides such a solution.  For example, as the CPC 
recognizes, “Inevitably, the practical application of the Code to 
the diverse situations that confront an active profession in a 
changing society will reveal gaps, ambiguities and apparent 
inconsistencies.”109  The lawyer-as-professional model does not 
necessarily offer further comfort.  What it does offer, however, is 
a forced nod to reality that takes into account all that is going 
on in the representative’s mind.  It also—in a real way—takes 
seriously ethical, public and other interests that current 
representative negotiation models do not.  And when conflicts 
do arise, the negotiator-as-professional is not apologetic, when 
appropriate, in preferring (with full disclosure to the client) 
ethical and public interests over those of his or her client.  This 
again can align with the spirit of the professional obligations of 
lawyers generally.  As the CPC provides, in situations of conflict 
or competing ethical considerations: “the principle of protection 
of the public interest will serve to guide the practitioner to the 
applicable principles of ethical conduct…”110  Again, far from 
irrelevant, a lawyer’s “personal conscience”111 and “sensitive 
professional and moral judgment”112 will animate a lawyer’s 
                                            
109 CPC, supra note 44 at Preface.  See also Model Rules, supra note 43 at 
Preamble, para. 9.  See further notes 67-70 and surrounding text. 
 
110 CPC, supra note 44 at Preface. 
 
111 Model Rules, supra note 43 at Preamble, para. 7. 
 
112 Ibid. at Preamble, para. 9. 
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thinking in applying and resolving competing ethical 
obligations. 
At the end of the day, then, what the model offers is hopefully a 
nuanced calculus of all interests that are on the table.  This 
account should assist in situating the representative’s role vis-à-
vis his or her client and others potentially involved or interested 
in a negotiation.  In tough cases—when representative and client 
interests appear to collide—the model will assist in the difficult 
work that is done in advance of the negotiation in the context of 
discussions between the representative and his or her client 
when contemplating a retainer or, later, when preparing for a 
negotiation.  And finally, if conflicts persist, it is 
acknowledged—in these tough cases—that the model may not 
ultimately assist with the resolution of those conflicts.  
However, even then, the model will succeed in giving adequate 
authority and support to the representative who is trying—vis-à-
vis the competing interests that are still at play—to work out 
what s/he should do, with knowledge of the client, including 
potentially declining to accept or continue with a retainer. 
V. CONCLUSION 
What I have tried to argue is that representative negotiation 
models advanced to-date, like the zealous advocacy model or the 
“boundary role position” model lose sight of, or only pay passing 
lip service to, the many (and potentially competing) interests 
that make up the mindset of a representative negotiator.  The 
negotiator-as-professional model takes seriously a much more 
expansive view of potentially competing interests in the mind of 
the representative negotiator.  Because the different interests 
will come up in different ways and may or may not compete in 
any given situation, the importance of this model is not that it 
paints bright lines in terms of resolving all tensions at all times; 
but rather that it assists in identifying the competing interests at 
play and thereby forces the representative negotiator to address 
and potentially resolve competing interests and conflicts ahead 
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of time rather than simply ignoring them, being unaware of 
them, or being trapped by them. 
At the end of the day, choices need to be made in the 
negotiation process.  And they need to be made with the client.  
Should different negotiation styles be considered?  If so, who has 
the final say?  Based on whose interests, etc.?  What is the 
desired outcome?  Again, whose interests should drive this 
calculus?  Etc.  And these choices may also lead to 
representatives declining a given client’s brief.  This is all a 
healthy part of the negotiation process.  And as I have argued, 
the alternative—ignoring these interests and tying the 
representative’s hands in favour of blind zealous 
representation—is not a healthy (or professional) way to proceed.   
Further, and in any event, representative negotiators should care 
about this discussion because the client’s case, while clearly 
central to the representative’s mental calculus, is only one case.  
The lawyer’s approach and reputation as a representative 
negotiator in the legal community follow him or her for an 
entire career.  And while it takes years to develop a solid 
reputation as a lawyer and negotiator, it takes about five 
minutes to destroy one.  So the lawyer clearly has a personal, 
professional and financial stake in his or her reputation as a 
lawyer and negotiator—independent of the client—vis-à-vis 
negotiation style and the bargaining opposite.  These same 
interests will also likely be at stake for the representative’s 
bargaining opposite.  They therefore need to be considered as 
meaningful aspects of the processes when preparing for a 
negotiation. 
In my view, the negotiator-as-professional model should find 
favour in, or at least be potentially beneficial to, all layers of the 
legal community.  In terms of clients, to the extent that lawyers 
are hired to provide expertise, not only regarding the substance 
of a given problem, but also on the process of how that problem 
should be resolved, resting significant control over that process 
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in the hands of lawyers should, as a systemic matter, work to 
the benefit of clients and their causes.  It is also of benefit to 
clients on the theory that full communication is not only 
professionally required113 but is also beneficial to their 
interests.114  The model will benefit lawyer representatives 
individually and the profession generally, not only in giving 
lawyers significant control over how they negotiate, but also in 
how they feel about themselves as empowered agents in the 
building of their client’s cases and their own careers.  Finally, 
this model will also potentially benefit society as a whole, both 
through increased general professional behaviour as well as 
specific lawyering conduct that takes seriously social welfare 
considerations in the calculus of competing courses of conduct. 
As I have readily acknowledged, there may be some cases in 
which competing interests do not lend themselves well to 
resolution, and in those cases, lawyers will need to think 
seriously about withdrawal from the case.  But as I have argued, 
what we are talking about is not simply learning how to 
negotiate one case for one client, but rather what a lawyer—and 
certainly a representative legal negotiator—does during a 
significant portion of his or her day for a significant portion of 
his or her career.  Without taking seriously all of these 
potentially competing interests, my view is that we proceed 
with a very impoverished sense of what that career has, does, 
can and should look like.  Without taking seriously all of these 
interests, we do not have an adequate answer to my student who 
                                            
113 See e.g. Ibid. at r. 1.4, CPC, supra note 44 at ch. III, RPC, supra note 44 at 
r. 2.02(1). 
 
114 See e.g. “Teaching Negotiators to Analyze Conflict Structure and 
Anticipate the Consequences of Principle-Agent Relationships”, supra note 6 
at 658.  Further, as Chornenki and Hart argue, “Good lawyers are 
scrupulously honest with their clients.  They deliver good news and bad; they 
do not withhold unpleasant advice or distort it because the client will find it 
unpalatable.”  Bypass Court, supra note 51 at 142. 
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is otherwise dissatisfied and disillusioned with the potential of a 
career as a representative negotiator.  The negotiator-as-
professional model, in my view, provides us with a better sense 
of the lawyer’s role that will help to address some of the 
theoretical and practical challenges and opportunities of the 
representative negotiation process. 
